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Abstract - Mobile adhoc network (MANET) is a temporary network setup for a specific purpose without help of 
any preexisting infrastructure. The nodes in MANET are empowered to exchange packet using a radio 
channel. The nodes not in direct reach of each other uses their intermediate nodes to forward packets. 
(MANET) environment of MANET makes it vulnerable to various network attacks. A common type of attacks 
targets at the underlying routing protocols. Malicious nodes have opportunities to modify or discard routing 
information or advertise fake routes to attract user data to go through themselves. Some new routing protocols 
have been proposed to address the issue of securing routing information. However, a secure routing protocol 
cannot singlehandedly guarantee the secure operation of the network in every situation. The objectives of the 
paper is to study the performance and effectiveness of some secure routing protocols in these simulated 
malicious scenarios, including ARIADNE and the Secure Ad hoc On-demand Distance Vector routing protocol 
(SAODV). 
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Abstract -

obile Ad-hoc network is a set of wireless 
devices called wireless nodes, which 
dynamically connect and transfer information. 
Wireless nodes can be personal computers 
(desktops/laptops) with wireless LAN cards, Personal 
Digital Assistants (PDA), or other types of wireless or 
mobile communication devices. Figure 1 illustrates what 
MANET is. In general, a wireless node can be any 
computing equipment that employs the air as the 
transmission medium. As shown, the wireless node may 
be physically attached to a person, a vehicle, or an 
airplane, to enable wireless communication among 
them..
 
Figure 1  Mobile Ad-hoc Network 
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
Routing protocols in ad hoc mobile wireless 
network can generally be divided into three groups 
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x Table driven: Every node in the network maintains 
complete routing information about the network by 
periodically updating the routing table. Thus, when a 
node needs to send data packets, there is no delay 
for discovering the route throughout the network. 
This kind of routing protocols roughly works the 
same way as that of routing protocols for wired 
networks. 
x Source initiated (or demand driven): In this type of 
routing, a node simply maintains routes to active 
destination that it needs to send data. The routes to 
active destinations will expire after some time of 
inactivity, during which the network is not being 
used.  
x Hybrid: This type of routing protocols combines 
features of the above two categories. Nodes 
belonging to a particular geographical region or 
within a certain distance from a concerned node are 
said to be in the routing zone and use table driven 
routing protocol. Communication between nodes in 
different zones will rely on the on-demand or 
source-initiated protocols.  
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 Mobile adhoc network (MANET) is a temporary
network setup for a specific purpose without help of any pre-
existing infrastructure. The nodes in MANET are empowered to
exchange packet using a radio channel. The nodes not in 
direct reach of each other uses their intermediate nodes to
forward packets. (MANET) environment of MANET makes it
vulnerable to various network attacks. A common type of
attacks targets at the underlying routing protocols. Malicious
nodes have opportunities to modify or discard routing
information or advertise fake routes to attract user data to go
through themselves. Some new routing protocols have been
proposed to address the issue of securing routing information.
However, a secure routing protocol cannot single-handedly 
guarantee the secure operation of the network in every
situation. The objectives of the paper is to study the
performance and effectiveness of some secure routing
protocols in these simulated malicious scenarios, including
ARIADNE and the Secure Ad hoc On-demand Distance Vector 
routing protocol (SAODV).
The Dynamic Source Routing Protocol is one of 
the on-demand routing protocols, and is based on the 
concept of source routing. In source routing, a sender 
node has in the packet header the complete list of the 
path that the packet must travel to the destination node. 
That is, every node in the path just forwards the packet 
to its next hop specified in the header without having to 
check its routing table as in table-driven routing 
protocols. Besides, the nodes don’t have to periodically 
broadcast their routing tables to the neighboring nodes. 
This saves a lot of network bandwidth. The two phases 
of the DSR operation are described below: 
x Route Discovery phase  
In this phase, the source node searches a route 
by broadcasting route request (RREQ) packets to its 
neighbors. Each of the neighbor nodes that has 
received the RREQ broadcast then checks the packet to 
determine which of the following conditions apply: (a) 
Was this RREQ received before ? (b) Is the TTL (Time To 
Live) counter greater than zero? (c) Is it itself the 
destination of the RREQ? (d) Should it broadcast the 
RREQ to its neighbors?  The request ids are used to 
determine if a particular route request has been 
previously received by the node. Each node maintains a 
table of RREQs recently received. Each entry in the table 
is a <initiator, request id> pair. If two RREQs with the 
same <initiator, request id> are received by a node, it 
broadcasts only the one received first and discards the 
other. This mechanism also prevents formation of 
routing loops within the network. When the RREQ packet 
reaches the destination node, the destination node 
sends a reply packet (RREP) on the reverse path back 
to the sender. This RREP contains the recorded route to 
that destination. 
Figure 2 shows an example of the route 
discovery phase. When node A wants to communicate 
with node G, it initiates a route discovery mechanism 
and broadcasts a request packet (RREQ) to its 
neighboring nodes B, C and D as shown in the figure. 
However, node C also receives the same broadcast 
packets from nodes B and D. It then drops both of them 
and broadcasts the previously received RREQ packet to 
its neighbors. The other nodes follow the same 
procedure. When the packet reaches node G, it inserts 
its own address and reverses the route in the record and 
unicasts it back on the reversed path to the destination 
which is the originator of the RREQ.  
The destination node unicasts the best route 
(the one received first) and caches the other routes for 
future use. A route cache is maintained at every node so 
that, whenever a node receives a route request and 
finds a route for the destination node in its own cache, it 
sends a RREP packet itself instead of broadcasting it 
further. 
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Figure 2
 
Route Discovery in DSR
 x

Route Maintenance
 The route maintenance phase is carried out 
whenever there is a broken link between two nodes. A 
broken link can be detected by a node by either 
passively monitoring in promiscuous mode or actively 
monitoring the link. As shown in Figure 3, when a link 
break (F-G) happens, a route error packet (RERR) is 
sent by the intermediate node back to the originating 
node. The source node re-initiates the route discovery 
procedure to find a new route to the destination. It also 
removes any route entries it may have in its cache to 
that destination node.
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 Figure 3  Route Maintenance in DSR 
DSR benefits from source routing since the 
intermediate nodes do not need to maintain up-to-date 
routing information in order to route the packets that 
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they receive. There is also no need for any periodic 
routing advertisement messages. However, as size of 
the network increases, the routing overhead increases 
since each packet has to carry the entire route to the 
destination along with it. The use of route caches is a 
good mechanism to reduce the propagation delay but 
overuse of the cache may result in poor performance 
[7]. Another issue of DSR is that whenever there is a link 
break, the RERR packet propagates to the original 
source, which in turn initiates a new route discovery 
process. The link is not repaired locally. Several 
optimizations to DSR have been proposed, such as 
non- propagating route requests (when sending RREQ, 
nodes set the hop limit to one preventing them from re-
broadcasting), gratuitous route replies (when a node 
overhears a packet with its own address listed in the 
header, it sends a RREP to the originating node 
bypassing the preceding hops), etc. 

To find routes, the AODV routing protocol [9] 
uses a reactive approach and to identify the most recent 
path it uses a proactive approach. That is, it uses the 
route discovery process similar to DSR to find routes 
and to compute fresh routes it uses destination 
sequence numbers. The two phases of the AODV 
routing protocol are described below. 
x Route Discovery 
In this phase, RREQ packets are transmitted by 
the source node in a way similar to DSR. The 
components of the RREQ packet include fields such as 
the source identifier (SId), the destination identifier (DId), 
the source sequence number (SSeq), the destination 
sequence number (DSeq), the broadcast identifier (BId), 
and TTL. When a RREQ packet is received by an 
intermediate node, it could either forward the RREQ 
packet or prepare a Route Reply (RREP) packet if there 
is an available valid route to the destination in its cache. 
To verify if a particular RREQ has already been received 
to avoid duplicates, the (SId, BId) pair is used. While 
transmitting a RREQ packet, every intermediate node 
enters the previous node’s address and its BId. A timer 
associated with every entry is also maintained by the 
node in an attempt to delete a RREQ packet in case the 
reply has not been received before it expires.  
When a node receives a RREP packet, the 
information of the previous node is also stored in it in 
order to forward the packet to it as the next hop of the 
destination. This plays a role of a “forward pointer” to 
the destination node. By doing it, each node contains 
only the next hop information; whereas in the source 
routing, all the intermediate nodes on the route towards 
the destination are stored.  
Figure 4 depicts an example of route discovery 
mechanism in AODV. Suppose that node A wishes to 
forward a data packet to node G but it has not an 
available route in its cache. It then initiates a route 
discovery process by broadcasting a RREQ packet to all 
its neighboring nodes (B, C and D).  
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Figure 4  Route discovery in AODV 
 
When RREQ packet reaches to nodes B, C and 
D, these nodes immediately search their respective 
route caches for an existing route. In the case where no 
route is available, they forward the RREQ to their 
neighbors; otherwise a comparison is made between 
the destination sequence number (DSeq) in the RREQ 
packet and the DSeq in its corresponding entry in the 
route cache. It replies to the source node with a RREP 
packet consisting of the route to the destination in the 
case the DSeq in the RREQ packet is greater. 
x Route Maintenance 
The way that the route maintenance mechanism 
works is described below. Whenever a node finds out a 
link break (via link layer acknowledgements or HELLO 
messages [9]), it broadcasts an RERR packet (in a way 
similar to DSR) to notify the source and the end nodes.  
This process is illustrated in Figure 5 If the link between 
nodes C and F breaks on the path A-C-F-G, RERR 
packets will be sent by both F and C to notify the source 
and the destination nodes. 
The main advantage of AODV is the avoidance 
of source routing to reduce the routing overload in a 
large network. Another good feature of AODV is its 
application of expanding-ring-search to control the flood 
of RREQ packets and search for routes to unknown 
destinations [10]. In addition, it also supplies destination 
sequence numbers, allowing the nodes to have more 
up-to-date routes. However, some notes have to be 
taken into consideration when using AODV. Firstly, it 
requires bidirectional links and periodic link layer 
acknowledgements to detect broken links. Secondly, 
unlike DSR, it needs to maintain routing tables for route 
maintenance unlike DSR. 
© 2012 Global Journals Inc.  (US)
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Figure 5  Route Maintenance in AODV 
 

In general, the attacks on routing protocols can 
generally be classified as routing disruption attacks 
[14][15] and resource consumption attacks [14][15]. In 
routing disruption attacks, the attacker tries to disrupt 
the routing mechanism by routing packets in wrong 
paths; in resource consumption attacks, some non-
cooperative or selfish nodes may try to inject false 
packets in order to consume network bandwidth. Both 
of these attacks are examples of Denial of Service (DoS) 
attacks. Figure 6 depicts a broader classification of the 
possible attacks in MANETs. 
x Attacks using Modification 
In this type of attacks, some of the protocol 
fields of the messages passed among the nodes are 
modified, thereby resulting in traffic subversion, 
redirection or Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. The 
following sections discuss some of these attacks. 
o Modification of Route Sequence Numbers :  This 
attack is possible against the AODV protocol. The 
malicious node can change the sequence number 
in the route request packets or route reply packets 
in order to make the route fresh. In Figure 7, 
malicious node M receives a route request RREQ 
from node B that originates from node S and is 
destined for node X. M unicasts a RREP to B with a 
higher destination sequence number for X than the 
value last advertised by X. The node S accepts the 
RREP and then sends the data to X through M. 
When the legitimate RREP from X gets to S, if the 
destination number is less than the one advertised 
by M, then it will be discarded as a stale route. The 
situation will not be corrected until a valid RREP with 
higher sequence number than that of M gets to S. 
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Figure 7 An example of route modification attack 
 
o Modification of Hop Count : This type of attacks is 
possible against the AODV protocol in which a 
malicious node can increase the chance that they 
are included in a newly created route by resetting 
the hop count field of a RREQ packet to a lower 
number or even zero. Similar to route modification 
attack with sequence number, the hop count field in 
the routing packets is modified to attract data traffic. 
o Modification of Source Route : This attack is 
possible against DSR which uses source routes and 
works as follows. In Figure 7, it is assumed that the 
shortest path exists from S to X. It is also assume 
that C and X cannot hear each other, that nodes B 
and C cannot hear each other, and that M is a 
malicious node attempting a denial-of-service 
attack. Suppose S sends a data packet to X with the 
source route S-A-B-C-D-X. If M intercepts this 
packet, it removes D from the list and forwards it to 
C. C will attempt to forward this packet to X which is 
not possible since C cannot hear X. Thus M has 
successfully launched a DoS attack on X. 
 
x Attacks Using Impersonation 
This type of attacks violates authenticity and 
confidentiality in a network. A malicious node can 
impersonate or spoof the address of another node in 
order to alter the vision of the network topology as 
perceived by another node. Such attacks can be 
described as follows in Figure 8 
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Figure 8
 
An example of impersonation attack
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Node S wants to send data to node X and 
initiates a Route Discovery process. The malicious node 
M, closer to node S than node X, impersonates node X 
as X’. It sends a route reply (RREP) to node S. Without 
checking the authenticity of the RREP, node S accepts 
the route in the RREP and starts to send data to the 
malicious node. This type of attacks can cause a routing 
loop within the network.  
x Special Attacks 
In addition to the attacks described above, 
there are two other severe attacks which are possible 
against routing protocols such as AODV and DSR.  
o Wormhole Attack : The wormhole attack [11] is a 
severe type of attacks in which two malicious nodes 
can forward packets through a private “tunnel” in 
the network as shown in Figure 9.  
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Figure 9  An example of wormhole attack 
 
Here, M1 and M2 are two malicious nodes which 
link through a private connection. Every packet that M1 
receives from the network is forwarded through 
“wormhole” to node M2, and vice versa. This attack 
disrupts routing protocols by short circuiting the normal 
flow of routing packets. Such a type of attack is difficult 
to detect in a network, and may severely damages the 
communication among the nodes. Such an attack can 
be prevented by using packet leashes [18], which 
authenticate the timing information in the packets to 
detect faked packets in the network.  
o Black Hole Attack : A node advertises a zero metric 
for all destinations causing all nodes around it to 
route data packets towards it. The AODV protocol is 
vulnerable to such an attack. 

The performance data of four routing protocols 
(DSR, ARIADNE, AODV and SAODV) are collected.  A 
scenario is set up for data collection. This scenario is 
run 11 times with 11 different values of the mobility 
pause time ranging from 0 to 100 seconds. The data is 
collected according to two metrics  
x Packet Delivery Fraction  
x Normalized Routing Load 
 In general, the actual values of the 
performance metrics in a given scenario are affected by 
many factors, such as node speed, moving direction of 
the nodes, the destination of the traffic, data flow, 
congestion at a specific node, etc. It is therefore difficult 
to evaluate the performance of a protocol by directly 
comparing the acquired metrics from individual 
scenarios. In order to obtain representative values for 
the performance metrics, we decided to take the 
average values of multiple simulation runs. The average 
values of these 11 simulation runs are then calculated 
for the two metrics and used as a baseline to evaluate 
the performance of routing protocols in malicious 
environments.  
 
Figure 10  Packet Delivery Fraction vs. pause time 
values in benign environment 
 
As shown in Figure 10 the percentage of 
packets delivered in AODV and SAODV is fairly close to 
each other, and both methods exhibit superior 
performance (~90% in general). The security features in 
SAODV lower the performance a little bit. Actually, the 
generation and verification of digital signatures depends 
on the power of the mobile nodes and causes a delay in 
routing packet processing. In the simulation 
environments, this delay depends on the simulation 
running machine and is not high enough to make the 
significant difference for the PDF metric. On the other 
hand, the packet delivery fraction in DSR and ARIADNE 
are 20-40% lower than that of AODV/SAODV across the 
board given different mobility pause times.  
  The major difference between AODV and DSR 
is caused by difference in their respective routing 
algorithms. It was reported by other researchers [5] [7] 
that, in high mobility and/or stressful data transmission 
scenarios, AODV outperforms DSR. The reason is that 
DSR heavily depends on the cached routes and lack 
any mechanism to expire stale routes. In the benign 
environment of our experiments, the default expiry timer 
Packet Delivery Fraction of the routing protocols 
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of cached route for DSR and ARIADNE is 300 seconds, 
while this number is 3 seconds for AODV and SAODV. In 
respect to the protocol design, these values are kept 
unchanged through all the simulation scenarios. 
Furthermore, DSR and ARIADNE store the complete 
path to the destination. Hence, if any node moves out of 
the communication range, the whole route becomes 
invalid. In MANETs, the nodes are mobile, so route 
change frequently occurs. Without being aware of most 
recent route changes, DSR may continue to send data 
packets along stale routes, leading to the increasing 
number of data packets being dropped.  
  The situation is even worse for ARIADNE, 
mainly because ARIADNE relies on the delayed key 
disclosure mechanism of TESLA when authenticating 
packets, including the RERR packets. When an 
intermediate node in ARIADNE notices a broken link, it 
sends a RERR message to the source node of the data 
packet. The source node, however, simply saves the 
RERR message, because it has not yet received from 
the intermediate node the key needed to authenticate 
the route error. The source node keeps sending the data 
until the second route error is triggered, and another 
RERR is received. Only then would the previous route 
error be authenticated, and the broken link not be used 
any more. This explains the worse performance of 
ARIADNE in comparison with DSR and other protocols.  
 
 
Figure 11  Normalized Routing Load vs. pause time values in benign environment 
 
As shown in Figure 11, the NRL metric is, in general, inversely proportional to the PDF metric. A low PDF 
value corresponds to a high NRL value. This relationship between PDF and NRL is further illustrated in Table 1.1, 
which lists the average values of the two metrics over 11 simulation runs for each of the four protocols. 
 
Pause Time 
(seconds) 
Packet Delivery 
Fraction (%) 
Normalized Routing 
Load 
DSR 68.41% 1.72 
ARIADNE 54.70% 2.58 
AODV 93.45% 1.01 
SAODV 92.00% 0.98 
Table 1.1  The “baseline” metrics of the four protocols  
 
 

In this paper, I have implemented two secure 
routing protocols, ARIADNE and SAODV, based on their 
respective underlying protocols, DSR and AODV, in the 
OPNET simulation environment. I have also simulated 
four  popular  network   attack   models  that  exploit  the  
 
weakness of the protocols. The attack models are used 
to make malicious wireless nodes and create various 
malicious environments, in which the performance of 
DSR, AODV, ARIADNE, and SAODV are evaluated. 
AODV and SAODV without pubic key verification are 
vulnerable to impersonation attacks. The impacts on the 
Normalized Routing Load of the routing protocols 
in benign environment
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two protocols are similar. The more the number of 
malicious nodes in the network is, the fewer the number 
of received data packets is. As shown by the 
experiments, SAODV is secure against impersonation 
attack only when there is a way to verify the public key of 
the route reply originator. In other words, a key 
management center is really necessary to make SAODV 
secure against impersonation attacks. This is still an 
outstanding issue of SAODV. The ultimate goal of a 
routing protocol is to efficiently deliver the network data 
to the destinations; therefore, two metrics, Packet 
Delivery Fraction (PDF) used to evaluate the protocols. 
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